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In many industries, brands systematically switch advertising on and off, a tactic often 
referred to as pulsing. The appropriate timing of these pulses in a competitive environment is an 
issue of debate. While some research suggests that advertising out-of-phase with the competition 
is most effective (e.g., Danaher, Bonfrer, & Dhar, 2008; Villas-Boas, 1993), others argue that 
timing advertising in-phase with the competition is more profitable (e.g., Freimer & Horsky, 
2012; Park & Hahn, 1991). While previous research has extensively studied the performance 
consequences of advertising spending, much less is known about (1) what drives managers’ 
decisions on when to advertise and (2) if these decisions are in line with normative theory. The 
primary aim of this study is therefore to determine if, and to what extent, the competitive 
advertising timing patterns suggested in the normative literature are observable in practice. 
In this paper, we investigate the timing of advertising expenditures for 370 CPG brands in 
71 product categories over a four-year period. We first establish empirically that pulsing is indeed 
the dominant form of advertising scheduling. Next, we show that advertising in-phase with 
competitors is more widespread than out-of-phase. Finally, we show that the extent to which 
advertising is in-phase depends on brands’ relative position with regard to advertising 
effectiveness, price positioning, and market power in the competitive interaction.  
 






Advertising remains one of the most visible and frequently used marketing instruments. 
In 2014, the world’s 25 largest advertisers collectively spent $73.68 billion (Advertising Age, 
2016). The largest advertiser was Procter & Gamble, with $10.13 billion. Other heavy spenders 
in the CPG sector included Unilever ($7.39 billion), L’Oréal ($5.26 billion), and Coca-Cola 
($3.28 billion). In the car industry, Toyota Motor Company and General Motors spent $3.19 
billion and $2.85 billion each, while Samsung Electronics and Sony Corp. spent $1.91 billion 
and 2.35 billion, respectively. In relative terms, Shimp (2010) reports that, across nearly 200 
categories of B2C and B2B products and services, advertising expenditures are on average 3% of 
firm sales, albeit with considerable variation across companies. Procter & Gamble reports 17% 
for its US operations, and for L’Oréal and Estée Lauder, this percentage is no less than 30%.  
Given this prominent position in marketing investments, it should come as no surprise 
that advertising has been the subject of a large body of research (see e.g., Tellis and Ambler 
[2007] for a review). Within this research, two important streams can be distinguished. First, an 
extensive empirical literature has focused on quantifying the impact of advertising on sales or 
market share. Sethuraman, Tellis, and Briesch (2011) compiled 751 short-term brand-level 
elasticities and 402 long-term advertising elasticities from 56 studies in that tradition, and report 
an average short-run (long-run) elasticity of .12 (.24). Second, a normative literature has studied 
– among other – under what conditions pulsing (as opposed to even spending) is an optimal 
advertising strategy (see e.g., Feinberg, 1992; Sasieni, 1971; Villas-Boas, 1993).  
However, advertising spending patterns as observed in practice have received relatively 
little empirical attention. Whereas several normative studies (Freimer & Horsky, 2012; Park & 





scheduling – in-phase or out-of-phase –, little is known about how companies actually time their 
actions. The primary aim of this study is therefore to investigate if, and to what extent, the 
competitive advertising timing patterns suggested in the normative literature are observable in 
practice. 
To achieve this aim we analyze the timing of advertising expenditures for 370 CPG 
brands in 71 product categories over a four-year period. First, we investigate the volatility in 
brands’ advertising spending and provide insights on the extent to which pulsing is adopted in 
practice. Then we develop a measure of in-phase versus out-of-phase behavior to provide model-
free evidence on timing decisions in a competitive environment. Finally, we formulate an 
empirical model to control for seasonality, trends, and brand characteristics to establish robust 
estimates of competitive in-phase /out-of-phase behavior. By estimating brand-specific effects 
across a large number of categories we are able to uncover empirical generalizations. It also 
allows us to study boundary conditions by investigating differences across brands with regard to 
their in-phase/out-of-phase behavior relative to competitors in advertising timing. Note that our 
empirical approach is descriptive; we therefore do not impose any particular structure on the 
competitive process. 
The paper is organized as follows: We first discuss pulsing in advertising scheduling, and 
provide arguments for in-phase and out-of-phase timing of advertising actions. Next, we present 
the data used in our analyses, provide evidence on the usage of pulsing schemes by brands, and 
present model-free insights on the extent to which brands advertise in-phase with competitors. 
We subsequently present model-based insights on the extent of in-phase advertising and discuss 







2. ADVERTISING PATTERNS 
2.1. Pulsing 
Over the past decades, a wide stream of research has focused on the optimality of 
different types of advertising scheduling patterns. The following patterns have been suggested: 
- Constant/even spending, i.e., advertising at a mostly equal level in each time period 
- Pulsing: Switching between periods of high and zero advertising. Note that spending 
levels my stay at a similar level for multiple period (e.g., an advertising campaign) 
- Pulsing with maintenance spending: Switching between periods of high and low 
advertising. 
- Chattering: High-frequency switching between high and zero spending. 
Over the years, the preponderance of the prescriptions from normative studies on the optimal 
timing of advertising has shifted from constant advertising schedules (Sasieni, 1971; 1989; 
Zielske, 1959) to pulsing advertising schedules (e.g., Mahajan & Muller, 1986). For example, 
Katz (1980) and Aravindakshan and Naik (2011) introduced learning and forgetting effects, 
while Aravindakshan and Naik (2015) discussed the impact of memory effects. Mesak (1992) 
and Naik, Mantrala, and Sawyer (1998) added, respectively, wear-out effects and quality 
restoration. Park and Hahn (1991), Villas-Boas (1993), Dubé, Hitsch, and Manchanda (2005), 
and Freimer and Horsky (2012), in turn, expanded the scope of this work to competitive settings. 
Pulsed advertising (with or without maintenance spending) is now generally considered to be the 
optimal choice for firms. Pulses that last for several weeks are called campaigns (Doganoglu & 
Klapper, 2006). 





and some empirical evidence to indicate managers use pulsing in practice (e.g., Dogangoglu & 
Klapper, 2006; Dubé et al., 2005; Naik et al., 1998). Figure 1 provides an illustration of pulsing, 
i.e., brands switching advertising on and off, in two different categories in our data.  
 
Figure 1.  Weekly Advertising Expenditures for Three Brands  
in the UK Soft Drink and Cleanser Markets 
 
The three upper panels show the weekly expenditures for three soft-drink brands in the 
UK. Brand A is a frequent and heavy advertiser (100% of weeks, average spending of £371,481 
per advertising week), while brand C is situated at the other end of the spectrum. It advertises 
42% of the time and spends only £45,950 per advertising week on average. Brand B takes an 
intermediate position: it advertises less often than brand A (61% of weeks, mainly in spring and 
summer), but spends a larger amount during campaigns than C (£119,987 per advertising week 
on average). The bottom panels of Figure 1 show three brands in the UK cleanser market. Again, 
we observe considerable variability.  





together with the fact that normative literature considers pulsing optimal in most instances, we 
expect that pulsing is the dominant form of advertising in practice.  
 
2.2. In-Phase Versus Out-Of-Phase Advertising Timing  
If companies adopt pulsing policies, they still must decide on the timing of their own 
advertising actions while taking into account the timing of competitors’ actions. Previous 
research has shown that managers indeed consider their competitors’ actions in marketing 
decisions (Montgomery, Moore, & Urbany, 2005). Based on discussions with industry experts, 
Dubé et al. (2005) posit that “managers track their own and their competitors’ advertising 
efforts” (p. 116, italics added) when deciding how to adjust their advertising tactics. How 
competitors should schedule their advertising campaigns relative to one another is, however, less 
clear. 
Advertising out-of-phase with competitors may increase effectiveness as it is easier to 
raise consumers’ consideration level for a firm’s products when the consideration level for 
competitors’ products is low (Villas-Boas, 1993). Danaher, Bonfrer, and Dhar (2008) show that 
the negative effects of competitive interference on sales can be quite strong as a focal brand’s 
advertising elasticity is halved when competitors advertise in the same week (i.e., in-phase). 
Freimer and Horsky (2012), in contrast, show that for sales retention levels within the 
range of values found in previous literature (.46 < δ < .73) it is optimal for brands to advertise in-
phase rather than out-of-phase. This could be because it is more difficult for brands to retain their 
market share when they do not advertise in-phase with competitors (Metwally, 1978). 
Furthermore, although the findings by Danaher et al. (2008) suggest a brand can achieve sales 





interfere with and thus “blunt the sword” of competitors’ advertising efforts.  
Figure 2 shows how timing choices can differ for brands in the UK soft drinks category. 
The figure shows the advertising actions of brands B and C from figure 1, and a third brand D 
with lower-frequency advertising. Whereas the advertising actions of brands B and C appear to 
be in-phase, brands C and D seem to avoid advertising at the same time (i.e., out-of-phase 
behavior). 
 
Figure 2. Advertising Timing of Three Brands in the UK Soft Drinks Category 
 
This example shows that, in practice, we can find both in-phase and out-of-phase 
advertising. Which of both types of behavior dominates in practice remains an empirical question 
that requires rigorous study. Given opposing arguments from previous literature, we thereby do 





2.3. Impact of Relative Competitive Position 
Based on previous research and anecdotal evidence provided above, we expect 
considerable heterogeneity in the extent to which brands advertise in-phase or out-of-phase 
with their competitors. This heterogeneity is the likely outcome of the relative position of the 
brands in their competitive interaction, as firms’ reactions to competitive actions are largely 
shaped by their ability and motivation to react, as well as by the visibility of the actions (Chen, 
1996; Chen & MacMillan, 1992). 
When brands achieve higher advertising effectiveness, advertising becomes a potent 
tool in competitive interactions and may be used to preserve market share against brands that 
are also able to achieve high levels of advertising effectiveness (see e.g., Metwally, 1978). 
Reacting with advertising is relatively easy and effective for these brands while at the same 
time the motivation to react is high, leading to more severe and active reaction behavior (Chen 
& MacMillan, 1992). Brands with lower advertising effectiveness, in turn, are less likely to use 
their relatively “blunt swords” to react to effective advertisers, but may still decide to advertise 
in-phase with other low-effectiveness advertisers to further limit their influence (see e.g., 
Danaher et al., 2008). While the ability to respond effectively may not be high, the motivation 
still is. Strong reactions by highly effective brands to other highly effective brands and by low-
effectiveness brands to other low effectiveness brands would also be in line with findings by 
Debruyne and Reibstein (2005) who show that competitive interactions are stronger the more 
the actors are alike. 
The (competitive) use of advertising, however, may also be linked to the price 
positioning of the brand in the category. Premium brands are characterized by high quality, 





(see e.g., Keller, 1993). These premium brands cater to the less price-sensitive segments (e.g., 
Gijsenberg, 2017), and consequently do not compete on price. In their interactions with other 
premium brands, they are therefore more likely to use non-price forms of competition like 
advertising. We consequently expect more intense competitive advertising interactions and in-
phase behavior among premium brands. Value brands, in turn, cater to the more price-sensitive 
segments, and are more likely to use their marketing budgets for price-oriented actions rather 
than advertising in their competitive interactions with other value brands. In-phase advertising 
behavior is therefore likely less intense among value brands. 
Brand strength or market power, as expressed by brand size (market share) has been 
identified as a key characteristic in advertising decisions (e.g. Patti & Blasko, 1981; Lynch & 
Hooley, 1990). Stronger brands such as market leaders benefit from high brand equity (e.g., 
Keller, 1993; 2007) and may feel less need to react by advertising in-phase with weaker brands 
as the former already have an established position in consumers’ minds (e.g., Kent & Allen, 
1994). This finding is also consistent with Steenkamp et al. (2005) who argue that an aggressive 
(i.e., in-phase) response to smaller brands is less likely as their actions may be less noticeable 
(Chen & MacMillan, 1992). Followers, on the other hand may feel a stronger urge to react in-
phase to the actions of stronger player’s more visible actions (Chen & MacMillan, 1992) and 
may rely on the leaders’ knowledge on how to be successful, including when to advertise. 
 
3. DATA 
The empirical analyses presented in this paper are based on a large set of CPG categories 
in the United Kingdom. The data cover a range of food, beverages, personal care, and household 





overview of the included product categories, along with the number of included brands is given 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Overview of Included Product Categories 
Product Class Number of Categories Example Categories Example Brands 
    
Food 25 Breakfast cereals Kellogg’s 
  Savory snacks Pringles 
  Yoghurt Danone 
 
Beverages 18 Lager Heineken 
  Mineral water Evian 
  Softdrinks Coca-Cola 
 
Personal care 18 Cleansers Oil of Olay 
  Dentifrice Colgate 
  Shampoo L’Oreal 
 
Household care 10 Household cleaners Flash 
  Liquid detergents Fairy 
  Machine wash products Ariel 
    
Total number 71  370 
 
 
We obtained four years (2002-2005) of weekly total advertising spending data from 
NielsenMedia. These expenditures may include television, radio, print, direct mail, outdoor and 
cinema advertising. We study brands that were available in the market for the full four years and 
that advertised in at least 10% of the weeks in our dataset. This provided us with 395 brands in 
96 categories. However, in 25 categories only 1 brand met the threshold, precluding estimation 
of competitive behavior. These categories were consequently removed resulting in a total of 370 
brands in 71 categories.  In contrast to previous studies, we include both small and large brands, 
resulting in an average market share of 7.4% (standard deviation: 9.6). Adopting the selection 





top-three market share in the category, would have reduced the number of brands in our study 
from 370 to only 150 brands. We focus on national brands, as private labels are typically not 
advertised at the category level (e.g., Lamey et al., 2012).1  
Information on volume sales and prices come from Kantar Worldpanel UK2. Data from 
this panel have been used in prior research (e.g., Van Heerde et al., 2013). Members of the panel 
receive a scanning device that they subsequently use to scan, on a daily basis, all the fast-moving 
consumer goods purchases they take home. These purchases can be made at mom-and-pop stores 
and drugstores up to large supermarket chains like Asda, Sainsbury’s, and Tesco. This 
information is then aggregated over the more than 17,000 British households in this consumer 
panel. A correct representation of the full population is obtained by weighing along the following 
dimensions: region, social grade, household size, housewife age, and family makeup. 
Although all 370 brands advertised in at least 10% of the weeks, considerable variability 
exists in their advertising behavior. On average, brands advertised 86 out of 207 weeks (41.5% 
of the time) with a standard deviation of 55 weeks. Average spending per advertising week was 
equal to £94,010, with a standard deviation of £79,366. 
 
4. MODEL-FREE INSIGHTS 
4.1. Observed Spending Patterns 
In our data only 5 brands have non-zero advertising levels in each week. Of the brands 
selected for our analysis (i.e., brands that advertise in more than 10% of weeks) the majority 
(57%) advertise in fewer than 40% of weeks. Figure 3 provides a histogram of the advertising 
                                                          
1 Private label brands were considered in the derivation of variables such as concentration level and market share 
change. 







Figure 3. Histogram of Advertising Frequencies 
 
 
For each brand we also calculated the coefficient of variation in advertising expenditures 
over time. Values greater than one occur when the standard deviation in advertising expenditures 
is larger than the mean. A histogram of the coefficient of variation values across brands is 
presented in Figure 4.  
Together, Figures 3 and 4 give strong evidence that pulsing is the dominant type of 
advertising pattern in the categories we study. Not only are there many weeks without 
advertising for almost all brands, the variation in expenditures is very high as well. Neither of 











Figure 4. Histogram of Number of Brands with Coefficient of Variation  
in Advertising Expenditures 
 
 
A visual inspection of the advertising spending patterns of the included brands allows for 
a more detailed view on actual advertising patterns. We thereby base ourselves upon previous 
literature, and distinguish between the following patterns: 
- Even spending: Permanent advertising at a mostly equal level. 
- Pulsing with maintenance spending: Switching between periods of high and 
continued low levels of advertising. Pulsing can be categorized as Campaigning 
(multi-week advertising periods), Spikes (one-week advertising periods), or Mixed. 
- Pulsing without maintenance spending: Switching between periods of high and non-
continued (low for one or a few weeks, then zero) or zero advertising. Pulsing can 
again be categorized as Campaigning, Spikes, or Mixed. 
- Chattering: High-frequency and regular switching between one-week high advertising 





The distribution across types of spending patterns is presented in Table 2. Even though 5 of the 
included brands advertise every week, none of them does at an even level (Even: 0%). On the 
other end of the spectrum, 3.7% of brand engage in chattering-like behavior. Confirming the 
insights reported above, the vast majority of brands show either pulsing without maintenance 
spending (57.3%) or pulsing with maintenance spending (39.0%). Within both pulsing patterns, 
campaigning and mixed schedules are dominant, with relatively few firms engaging in spiked 
behavior. 
 
Table 2. Distribution across Types of Advertising Patterns 
Type of Pattern  Percentage of Brands 
   
Even  .0% 
   
Pulsing with maintenance 39.0% 
          Campaigning  26.1% 
          Spikes  3.1% 
          Mixed  9.8% 
   
Pulsing without maintenance 57.3% 
          Campaigning  29.5% 
          Spikes  7.9% 
          Mixed  19.9% 
   
Chattering-like  3.7% 
   
 
Table 2 indicates that many brands in our data alternate between periods of high and 
periods of continued (maintenance) or non-continued (hence: not maintenance) low (but not 
zero) advertising (e.g., Brand B in the soft drinks market in Figure 1). Dube et al. (2005) show 
similar patterns in their data and suggest that the non-continued lower advertising levels may be 
attributable to “make good” weeks where the ad publisher was unable to achieve previous GRP 





interest in understanding competitive interactions between brands, we adapt the regular-vs-
promotion-price algorithm proposed by Van Heerde (1999) to identify advertising campaigns. In 
each week t, we identify two conditions: 
1. If a brand is not in a campaign in week t: 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡 = 0 
If 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡+1 > (1 + 𝛼𝛼) ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�����𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡+1 and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡+1 >  𝛿𝛿 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�����𝑏𝑏 , then 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡+1 = 1 else 
 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡+1 = 0. 
2. If a brand is in a campaign in week t: 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡 = 1  
If 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡+1 ≤ (1 − 𝛼𝛼) ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�����𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡+1 , then 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡+1 = 0 else 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡+1 = 1. 
where 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�����𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡+1 equals the average advertising spending in the previous 26 weeks (from t-25 to t) 
by brand b and 𝛼𝛼 represents the threshold factor which is set to .1. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�����𝑏𝑏 equals the average 
advertising spending over the whole four-year period by brand b, and 𝛿𝛿 represents a second 
threshold factor which is set to .5.3 Subsequent results are robust to the choice of the threshold 
levels. 
In order for a brand to be considered entering a campaign, its advertising spending in a 
specific week should be at least 10% higher than the average over the previous half year; in order 
for the brand to be considered leaving a campaign, its advertising spending in a specific week 
should be at least 10% lower that the average over the previous half year. To prevent minor 
changes (in absolute terms) during extended periods of low-spend advertising from being 
classified as campaigns, we introduce the additional requirement that, to be classified as a 
campaign, an advertising action should also exceed a certain minimum absolute threshold. This 
threshold is specified as 𝛿𝛿 times the overall average advertising action by that brand. 
 Figure 5 shows the relationship between brand advertising and the proportion of 
                                                          





expenditures that is classified as a campaign by the algorithm described above. Overall, 92% of 
expenditures are considered campaign behavior. In section 5.2 we discuss the robustness of our 
main results to alternative specifications of the algorithm. 
 
Figure 5. Histogram of Number of Brands with the Percentage of Advertising Expenditures  
that are Part of a Campaign 
 
 
4.2. In-Phase Versus Out-Of-Phase Advertising Timing 
To obtain initial insights on in-phase versus out-of-phase behavior of individual brands’ 
advertising, we calculate a model-free measure of advertising overlap. We start with the naïve 
random model described by Morrison (1969). If brands A and B advertise independently, the 
expected % of weeks with advertising by both brands is 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 =  𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴*𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴, where brand A 
advertises 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 % of weeks and brand B advertises 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴% of weeks. We compare the expected 
percentage of overlapping weeks to the observed percentage of overlapping weeks where the 





 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�  . 
When the phase measure equals 1, the observed number of weeks with advertising by 
both brand A and B equals the expected number based on an independence model and no 
apparent systematic competitive behavior is present. When the phase measure tends towards 0, 
fewer weeks with advertising by both brands are observed than expected, and competitive 
advertising behavior seems to be out-of-phase. As the phase measure exceeds 1, the number of 
weeks with advertising by both brands exceeds what would be expected if advertising was 
independent, suggesting competitors may be advertising in-phase.4  
 
Figure 6. Distribution of Phase Statistic 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the model-free phase measures. The graph shows the 
strong heterogeneity among brands with regard to in-phase versus out-of-phase timing of their 
advertising actions. In the vast majority of the cases (71.4%), the measure exceeds 1, suggesting 
                                                          
4 The upper limit is not fixed to a specific absolute value, but is determined by the percentage of weeks brands A 
and B are advertising. The theoretical absolute upper limit is reached when two brands A and B each advertise only 
once, but in exactly the same week. As we require brands to advertise at least 10% of the time, the theoretical upper 





in-phase advertising behavior. In the remaining cases (28.6%), the measure is less than 1 
indicating out-of-phase behavior, with 1.6% of the cases showing no overlap in advertising 
actions (i.e., the phase measure is equal to 0). The resulting average value of 1.280 (standard 
deviation = .583) suggests a tendency to schedule advertising in-phase with competitors.5 
 
5. MODEL-BASED INSIGHTS 
5.1. Methodology 
5.1.1. Empirical model 
The phase measure presented above provides initial insights on the extent of advertising 
overlap between competitors. However, this overlap, i.e., in-phase behavior, may be due to 
factors that are not linked to competitive considerations in advertising decisions. To obtain better 
estimates of competitive interactions, we analyze the advertising interactions of brands dyads 
within the same category (see e.g., Steenkamp et al., 2005). In our analyses, we allow for 
asymmetries in the relationships (e.g., brand A always advertising in-phase with brand B, but 
brand B not always advertising in-phase with brand A) by including each brand twice in the 
dyad: once as focal brand, and once as competitor.  
We use a binary logit model and include a set of factors to explain advertising-timing 
decisions. An advertising decision by brand b in dyad d during week t is described as: 
 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡 = �1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡∗ > 00 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡∗ ≤ 0           
The latent variable 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡∗  is modeled as follows:  
                                                          
5 For the three soft drink brands presented in figure 2, the measure equals 2.072 for brands B and C, and .249 for 






𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡∗ =  𝛽𝛽0,𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏 + 𝛽𝛽1,𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + �𝛽𝛽2,𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡12
𝑖𝑖=1
+ 𝛽𝛽3,𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 
+𝛽𝛽4,𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5,𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡,  +𝛽𝛽6,𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏[𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝]𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7,𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏[𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 > 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝]𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡  +𝛽𝛽8,𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏[𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝]𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9,𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏[𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 > 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝]𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡  +𝛽𝛽10,𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏∆𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡  
  Intra-year factors are perhaps the most obvious alternate explanation for correlation in 
competitors’ advertising behavior (e.g., Gijsenberg, 2017; Villas-Boas, 1993). Competing brands 
may advertise together during high demand periods, e.g., soft drink brands mainly advertising in 
spring and summer (brands B and C in Figure 1). Therefore, we start with a set of time control 
variables, capturing holiday and seasonality effects as well as possible trending behavior in 
advertising decisions. Our baseline model (Model 1) contains only these control variables. We 
add competitive factors CompPulse and CompAdPressure in Model 2. The former is a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if the competing brand in the dyad advertises, 0 otherwise. As such, 
this variable is the focal variable of interest when investigating the in-phase versus out-of-phase 
scheduling of the advertising actions of the focal brand with regard to the competitor in the dyad. 
The second competitive factor is a continuous variable representing the total advertising 
spending by all other brands in the category that are not included in the dyad, representing the 
remaining competitive advertising pressure we need to control for. 
In Model 3, we add the Time Since Previous Pulse (TSPP), defined as the number of 
weeks since the previous advertising pulse. We allow for different effects if the elapsed time 
since the previous pulse is smaller or larger than the previous interval between two pulses to 






Adstock concept (e.g., Broadbent, 1979; 1984). The first variable (TSPP ≤ TSPPprev) is defined 
as the elapsed time relative to the length of the previous interval and equals one beyond that 
duration. When a new campaign starts, values remain constant, and a new counting cycle starts 
when the campaign has ended. The second variable (TSPP > TSPPprev) equals the ratio of 
elapsed to the length of the previous interval time minus 1 once the current interval is longer than 
the previous and takes a value of zero before. Previous Time In Pulse (TIPprev) is defined in a 
similar manner as the length of previous advertising pulse. We allow for different effects if the 
elapsed time since the start of the pulse is smaller or larger than the previous observed duration. 
The first variable (TIP ≤ TIPprev) is defined as the elapsed time in the new campaign relative to 
the previous campaign duration until the duration is equal, and set to one beyond that point. The 
second variable (TIP > TIPprev) equals the ratio of elapsed to previous duration minus 1 once the 
current campaign is longer than the previous one and takes a value of zero before. After the 
campaign has ended, values remain constant, and a new counting cycle starts when a new 
campaign has started. 
Finally, in the Full model we account for short-term deviations in performance that may 
drive advertising behavior. ∆MarketShare is the first difference of the log-transformed brand 
volume sales over a moving window of previous 26 weeks (cfr. Franses & Koop, 1998). 
 
5.1.2. Model estimation 
To obtain an accurate view of in-phase and out-of-phase behavior in advertising actions, 
we estimate brand competition in pairs (see e.g. Steenkamp et al., 2005), in which we investigate 
the effect of competitive advertising actions by one specific competitor through the CompPulse 





competitor’s actions on the advertising decisions of the focal brand, and hence the extent of in-
phase versus out-of-phase behavior.  
We combine the individual-brand-dyad estimates using the added-Z method (Rosenthal, 
1991) to arrive at general across-brand insights on the significance of variables. To account for 
the fact that some of the variables are the same in dyads with the same focal brand, we a) 
calculate the within-brand average parameters for these variables, b) determine the associated 
standard deviations and significance levels, and c) apply the added-Z method to these brand-
specific across-dyad average parameters and significance levels. The added-Z method thus 
allows us to combine individual estimates and create generalizable insights in a straightforward 
way (e.g., Gijsenberg, 2014; 2017; van Heerde et al., 2013). The reported parameter values are 
the across-dyad uncertainty-weighted parameter estimates. 
 
5.1.3. Categorizing brands and exploring heterogeneity in competitive interactions 
As we argued above,  heterogeneity may exist in the extent to which brands advertise 
in-phase with competitors, depending on their own and their competitor’s relative position in 
the competitive interaction. We therefore investigate the impact of the focal brands’ advertising 
effectiveness (high or low advertising elasticity6), price positioning (premium or value) and 
market power (market leader or follower) relative to their competitor in the interaction on the 
extent to which the focal brand advertises in-phase with the competitor.  
For advertising effectiveness (price positioning) we apply a median split per category. 
Within each category, brands can be categorized as low-effective (value) on these dimensions if 
their value is below the median value and high-effective (premium) otherwise. This, in turn, 
                                                          
6 The advertising elasticities are estimated using a brand level partial adjustment model that accounts for own and 





yields four types of competitive interactions: (1) high-effective versus high-effective (premium 
versus premium), (2) high-effective versus low-effective (premium versus value), (3) low-
effective versus high-effective (value versus premium), and (4) low-effective versus low-
effective (value versus value). For market power, we look within each category at the average 
market share over the whole four-year period. The brand with the highest average share is 
considered the market leader, while the other brands in the category are considered followers. 
This then yields three types of competitive interaction: (1) leader versus follower, (2) follower 
versus leader, and (3) follower versus follower. Using the same methodology as presented in 
the previous section, we compare the uncertainty-weighted parameter estimates for the different 
types of interactions for each of the three factors.  
 
5.2. Substantive Insights 
5.2.1. Estimation results 
Table 3 shows the estimation results for the four alternative model specifications. For 
each of the models we show the median (1) pseudo-R², (2) BIC values, (3) hit rates, and (4) pulse 
(one-observation) hit rates, as well as the across-dyad uncertainty-weighted parameter estimates 
and significance levels based on the added Z-method (e.g., Gijsenberg, 2014; 2017; Van Heerde 










Table 3. Overall Across-Brand Parameter Estimates 
   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Full Model 4 












            Intercept ?̅?𝛽0 ≠ 0 -1.372 *** -3.420 *** -2.538 *** -2.676 *** -10.811 
Holiday ?̅?𝛽1 ≠ 0 .118 *** .095 *** -.034  -.076 ** -2.335 
Period1 ?̅?𝛽2,1 ≠ 0 .502 *** .421 *** -.113   -.094   -.398 
Period2 ?̅?𝛽2,2 ≠ 0 .683 *** .494 *** .637 *** .620 *** 4.365 
Period3 ?̅?𝛽2,3 ≠ 0 .391 *** .205 *** .400 *** .360 *** 2.747 
Period4 ?̅?𝛽2,4 ≠ 0 .347 *** .114 ** -.055   -.049   -.375 
Period5 ?̅?𝛽2,5 ≠ 0 .588 *** .349 *** .740 *** .745 *** 6.072 
Period6 ?̅?𝛽2,6 ≠ 0 .526 *** .343 *** .576 *** .503 *** 4.185 
Period7 ?̅?𝛽2,7 ≠ 0 .426 *** .228 *** .345 *** .330 *** 2.679 
Period8 ?̅?𝛽2,8 ≠ 0 .374 *** .191 *** .346 *** .419 *** 3.198 
Period9 ?̅?𝛽2,9 ≠ 0 .319 *** .113 ** .240 ** .104   .792 
Period10 ?̅?𝛽2,10 ≠ 0 .187 *** .030   .047   .000   .106 
Period11 ?̅?𝛽2,11 ≠ 0 .455 *** .278 *** .125   .107   .755 
Period12 ?̅?𝛽2,12 ≠ 0 .437 *** .233 *** .058   .078   .909 
Trend ?̅?𝛽3 ≠ 0 .074 *** .073 *** -.125   -.108   -.507 
            CompPulse ?̅?𝛽4 > 0   .182 *** .141 *** .139 *** 4.574 
CompAdPressure ?̅?𝛽5 > 0   .207 *** .197 *** .215 *** 25.362 
            
TSPP ≤ TSPPexp ?̅?𝛽6 > 0     1.755 *** 1.814 *** 34.070 
TSPP > TSPPexp ?̅?𝛽7 ≠ 0     .044 *** .038 *** 7.546 
TIP ≤ TIPexp ?̅?𝛽8 < 0     -4.138 *** -4.236 *** -81.404 
TIP > TIPexp ?̅?𝛽9 ≠ 0     .024 *** .016 * 1.689 
            ∆MarketShare ?̅?𝛽10 ≠ 0       3.254 *** 9.005 
                  25th pctile Pseudo R²  .172 .230 .506 .519 
Median Pseudo R²  .264 .312 .656 .671 
75th pctile Pseudo R²  .360 .427 .831 .863 
      
Median BIC  1.232 1.228 1.041 1.064 
Median Hit Rate  .821 .840 .929 .936 
Median Hit Rate Pulses (Ones) .381 .481 .828 .840 
      
% In-Phase   53.8% 52.2% 51.8% 
% Out-of-Phase   46.2% 47.8% 48.2% 
      
% In-Phase sig   16.9% 11.9% 11.7% 
% Out-of-Phase sig   8.4% 8.1% 8.0% 
% not sig   74.7% 80.0% 80.4% 
      * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. Tests are one-sided if clear directional effects are expected ,two-sided if not (Rosenthal, 1991). Deviations 
from 100% are due to rounding. 
 
To evaluate the robustness of our findings with regard to the choices of threshold values 





values. The first rival model sets α = .05 (vs .10); the second rival model uses a moving average 
of 13 weeks instead of 26; the third rival model uses a δ of .25 (vs .50); and the final rival model 
uses a δ of 1.00 (vs .50). Differences in parameters across models for our focal variables are 
small and significance levels are stable, establishing robustness of our findings. Detailed results 
are included in Appendix B. 
 
5.2.2. Drivers of advertising timing decisions.  
The estimates for Model 4 show that brands’ advertising timing decisions are affected by 
competitors’ actions, with both CompPulse (?̅?𝛽4= .139, p < .01) and CompAdPressure (?̅?𝛽5 = .215, 
p < .01) showing a significant positive effect. Moreover, the positive effect of CompPulse – an 
advertising action by the competitor brand having a positive effect on the odds of an advertising 
action by the focal brand – confirms our earlier model-free findings that brands are more likely 
to advertise in-phase with each other, in line with the findings of Freimer and Horsky (2012). 
 Estimates from Model 4 also show that, in addition to competitive pressures, internal 
dynamics play an important role in brands’ timing decisions. The longer the time since the 
previous campaign the stronger the pressure to start a new one as shown by the significant 
positive effect of TSPP ≤ TSPPprev (?̅?𝛽6 = 1.814, p < .01). However, once beyond the previous 
interval (TSPP > TSPPprev) the pressure growth levels off (?̅?𝛽7 = .038, p < .01), indicating a 
tendency to schedule campaigns at regular intervals. Similarly, the longer a brand is in a 
campaign the stronger the pressure to stop as shown by the significant negative effect of TIP ≤ 
TIPprev (?̅?𝛽8 = -4.236, p < .01). Campaigns seem not only to be scheduled at regular intervals but 
also to have similar durations. Once beyond the previous duration (TIP > TIPexp), however, the 





Even though both competitive and internal factors seem to drive advertising pulsing 
decisions, short-term factors also have a significant impact. Changes in market share have a 
positive effect on the decision to advertise (?̅?𝛽10 = 3.254, p < .01). It appears that in our data, 
advertising is not used to make up for weakening positions in the market, but instead is used to 
reinforce strengthening performance. This pattern is consistent with a percentage-of-sales 
decision rule to set advertising budgets (Miller & Pazgal, 2007). 
  
5.2.3. Relative impact of different drivers.  
The gradual build-up of our models helps to illustrate the relative importance and 
explanatory power of the different types of factors. Adding competitive factors to model 1 
increases the median pseudo R² by .048 and increases the correct prediction of pulses by .100. 
However, internal factors appear to play a more important role in brands’ advertising pulsing 
decisions as the median pseudo R² increases by .344 and the correct prediction of pulses goes up 
by .347 from model 2 to model 3. These differences in relative impact are in line with the 
findings by Montgomery et al. (2005) who show that current competitive behavior is mentioned 
as a driver of advertising decisions only about half as often as internal factors. Finally, short-term 
factors also add to the explanatory power of the model, albeit modestly. The median pseudo R² 
increases by .015 and the correct prediction of pulses increases by .012 from model 3 to the full 
model. Most importantly, alternative model specifications have little impact on the size and 
significance of the competitive influence variables. Controlling for seasonal, internal, and short-
term factors, competitive considerations play a consistent role in the timing of advertising 
decisions, with 19.6% (12.8%) of dyads showing evidence of significant in-phase or out-of-





5.3. In-Phase Versus Out-of-Phase Scheduling and Relative Competitive Position  
As shown in Table 3, in-phase competitive advertising timing is more common for 
brands than out-of-phase scheduling. However, we also find considerable heterogeneity in the 
extent to which brands advertise in-phase with competitors, depending on their own and their 
competitor’s relative position in the competitive interaction. In our full model we find 
significant evidence in-phase behavior, i.e., positive coefficient for CompPulse, in 11.7% of 
cases and significant out-of-phase behavior, i.e., negative coefficient for CompPulse, in 8.7% 
of cases.  Table 4 presents the phase coefficient for different types of competitive interactions, 
taking into account the relative position of the focal brands in the interaction.  
 
Table 4. Weighted Phase Coefficients for Different Types  
of Competitive Interactions 
Interaction Type Weighted Phase Coefficient 
    
Advertising effectiveness   
    
 High vs High .200 *** 
 High vs Low .068 
 Low vs High .056 
 Low vs Low .291 *** 
   
   
Price positioning  
   
 Premium vs Premium .228 *** 
 Premium vs Value .156 *** 
 Value vs Premium .164 *** 
 Value vs Value -.059 
   
   
Market power  
   
 Leader vs Follower .109 * 
 Follower vs Leader .200 ** 
 Follower vs Follower .136 *** 
    





Advertising effectiveness. Brands with low advertising elasticities show the strongest in-
phase advertising behavior in their interactions with other low-effectiveness brands (Low vs Low 
?̅?𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿= .291, p < .01). Brands with high advertising elasticities, in turn, use advertising as an 
effective tool to compete with other brands that also show a high advertising effectiveness (High 
vs High ?̅?𝛽4𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿= .200, p < .01) and are thus more likely to advertise in phase. Surprisingly, 
brands with low advertising effectiveness do not seek to advertise out-of-phase with more 
effective competitors (Low vs High ?̅?𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿: p > .10), while the latter are seemingly indifferent 
to what the low-effectiveness advertisers decide (High vs Low ?̅?𝛽4𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿: p > .10). 
Price positioning. Premium brands show strong in-phase advertising behavior with other 
premium brands (Premium vs Premium ?̅?𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒= .228, p < .01). Premium brands are more 
likely to use non-price forms of competition like advertising in order to maintain both their price 
image and their margins. Value brands, in turn, cater to the more price-sensitive segments, and 
are more likely to use their marketing budgets for price-oriented actions rather than advertising 
in their competitive interactions with other value brands (Value vs Value ?̅?𝛽4𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒: p > .10). 
Market power. Market leaders show only a weak tendency to advertise in-phase with 
followers (Leader vs Follower ?̅?𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿= .109, p < .10), Followers, on the other hand,  more 
actively react to the advertising actions by the leader, and show a stronger tendency to advertise 
in-phase with the latter (Follower vs Leader ?̅?𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿= .200, p < .05).  
 
6. DISCUSSION 
6.1. Summary  
In contrast to the large body of literature devoted to advertising effectiveness, the 





the best of our knowledge ours is the first large-scale investigation on the influence of 
competitive factors on the timing of advertising actions. Insights are based on a unique dataset 
covering four years of weekly data for 370 brands in 71 CPG categories. In contrast to many 
previous advertising studies we utilize data for both large and small brands.  
Our results first of all demonstrate that the vast majority of observed advertising patterns 
can be categorized as pulsing patterns, as most brands alternate multi-week advertising pulses 
(i.e., campaigns, combined or not with one-week spikes) with extended periods without any or 
just low maintenance advertising expenditures. The high coefficient of variation in ad spending 
for the majority of brands further supports this result.   
We provide model-free evidence of managers’ tendency to advertise in-phase with their 
competitors. Model-based results that account for the effects of competitive and internal factors, 
short-term deviations in performance, and time-related factors such as seasonality, are in line 
with the model-free findings and confirm that in-phase scheduling is more common than out-of-
phase scheduling (see Freimer and Horsky [2012] for a discussion on the theory underlying in-
phase advertising).   
Furthermore, we find considerable heterogeneity in the extent to which brands’ 
advertising schedules are influenced by their competitors’ actions, be it in-phase or out-of-phase, 
and this depending on the relative position of the focal brand versus the competitor in their 
competitive interaction. Brands which are very effective in their advertising advertise more in-
phase with other brands that are very effective, while low-effective advertisers advertise more in-
phase with other low-effective advertisers. High-price premium brands compete among each 
other with advertising, leading to more in-phase advertising, while low-price value brands are 





Finally, market followers show a strong tendency to follow the market leader in its advertising 
decisions, leading to stronger in-phase advertising scheduling. 
 
6.2. Conclusion 
The extent to which our empirical findings are in line with the normative literature is 
encouraging. While advertising has traditionally been regarded as a field where much is 
decided by gut-feel with little accountability and structure (“half the money I spend on 
advertising is wasted, however, I do not know which half”) we find evidence that advertising 
timing decisions are, at least partially, predictable. 
Notwithstanding the fact that observed patterns appear in line with guidelines from 
normative research, the influence of competitive factors on managers’ decisions is still limited. 
Our analyses show that the explanatory power of internal factors (i.e., Time Since Previous 
Pulse and Time In Pulse) on advertising timing decisions is nearly seven times larger than the 
explanatory power of competitive factors. This result is in line with findings by both 
Steenkamp et al. (2005), who find limited evidence of competitive reactions, and Montgomery 
et al. (2005), who find that current competitive behavior is mentioned by managers only about 
half as often as internal factors when it comes to advertising decisions. 
The limited attention given to competitive timing is even more surprising if we consider 
that the effectiveness of marketing investments can be influenced by the competitors’ actions. 
Danaher et al. (2008), for instance, show how the impact of advertising on sales can be strongly 
affected by the competitive timing of advertising campaigns. Their work confirms Chen’s (1996) 
influential inference that “the ultimate effectiveness of an action depends largely on the 





profitability implications of advertising timing decisions. Although no insights on this issue exist 
as yet, related work by Nijs et al. (2007) shows that inertia in pricing decisions is associated with 
lower retail margins. This result suggests that reliance on internal factors for advertising timing 
decisions (e.g., inertia) could negatively affect financial performance. If regularity in advertising 
timing is very high it is straightforward for competitors to anticipate these actions. For example, 
if Tide consistently advertises every other week competitors can time their advertising 
campaigns (either in- or out-of-phase) to their own advantage. These authors also show that 
margins are higher when pricing decisions are (partially) guided by changes in demand (i.e., 
demand-based pricing). If this insight extends beyond pricing it suggests that adjusting 
advertising schedules based on changes in market shares could bolster performance. 
The scope of our dataset, including brands from a wide range of different CPG 
categories, allowed us to study the heterogeneity in advertising behavior among brands and the 
role of the relative brand position in competitive interactions. In contrast to most empirical 
studies, we do not impose a minimum size for brands to be included in our analysis, adding to 
the external validity and generalizability of our findings. By studying boundary conditions, we 
are able to provide in-depth insights on when in-phase advertising is more likely to occur. Our 
study shows that the extent of “in-phaseness” of advertising depends on the relative position of 
the brands in the competitive interaction. Our findings on the impact of brands’ relative position 
with regard to advertising effectiveness, price positioning and market power on the extent to 
which they advertise in-phase with their competitors are in line with expectations derived from 
previous normative and empirical research. These results may also have implications for the 
assumptions used in analytical models. Not imposing a size threshold but including both large 





decisions, whereas market followers also follow in these decisions. At the same time, premium 
brands react stronger to premium brands, while interactions with value brands are much weaker.  
These insights suggests that theoretical models should consider additional brand level differences 
such as quality, pricing, etc. that influence market shares.  
Previous research has extensively studied the performance consequences of advertising 
spending. Much less is known about (1) how managers decide when to advertise and (2) to what 
extent decisions are in line with normative models and guidelines. Using data for 370 brands in 
71 CPG categories we provide new empirical insights in this important area. We hope our 
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APPENDIX A. PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT MODEL FOR SALES CARRY-OVER ESTIMATION 
 
 In line with Naik and Raman (2003) we formulate the following partial-adjustment model 
to obtain the individual brands’ advertising elasticities and sales carry-over parameters: 
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏,0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏,1𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏,2𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡  
+𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏,3𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏,4𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡  
+𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡  
 In equation (B1), we relate sales of brand b in week t (𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡) to the brand’s own 
marketing-mix instruments, i.e., advertising (𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡) and price (𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡). In addition, we 
control for the effects of marketing actions by competitors in the same category by including 
total advertising by competitors (𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡) and average price across competitors 
(𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡) as explanatory variables. Finally, we include sales in the previous week 
(𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡−1) in the model to account for sales carry-over effects. Parameter 𝛼𝛼𝑏𝑏,1 represents 
brand b’s advertising elasticity and parameter 𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏 captures the brand-specific carry-over effect we 







APPENDIX B. RIVAL MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
 
   α = .05 
δ = .50 
α = .10 
δ = .50 
α = .10 
δ = .25 
α = .10 
δ = 1.00 
  Expected 
sign Weeks = 26 Weeks = 13 Weeks = 26 Weeks = 26 
          Intercept ?̅?𝛽0 ≠ 0 -2.823 *** -2.574 *** -2.652 *** -2.654 *** 
Holiday ?̅?𝛽1 ≠ 0 -.045  -.057 * -.075 ** -.070 ** 
Period1 ?̅?𝛽2,1 ≠ 0 -.106  -.295 * -.087  -.043  
Period2 ?̅?𝛽2,2 ≠ 0 .790 *** .476 *** .602 *** .663 *** 
Period3 ?̅?𝛽2,3 ≠ 0 .470 *** -.024  .347 *** .377 *** 
Period4 ?̅?𝛽2,4 ≠ 0 .131  -.179  -.061  -.019  
Period5 ?̅?𝛽2,5 ≠ 0 .769 *** .242 ** .733 *** .741 *** 
Period6 ?̅?𝛽2,6 ≠ 0 .393 *** -.474 *** .492 *** .544 *** 
Period7 ?̅?𝛽2,7 ≠ 0 .218 * -.507 *** .321 *** .385 *** 
Period8 ?̅?𝛽2,8 ≠ 0 .357 *** -.177  .402 *** .483 *** 
Period9 ?̅?𝛽2,9 ≠ 0 .234 ** -.265 ** .128  .170  
Period10 ?̅?𝛽2,10 ≠ 0 .058  -.429 *** -.012  .064  
Period11 ?̅?𝛽2,11 ≠ 0 .225 ** -.068  .088  .164  
Period12 ?̅?𝛽2,12 ≠ 0 .027  -.286 ** .078  .119  
Trend ?̅?𝛽3 ≠ 0 -.217 * .051  -.113  -.110  
           CompPulse ?̅?𝛽4 > 0 .138 *** .165 *** .140 *** .139 *** 
CompAdPressure ?̅?𝛽5 > 0 .231 *** .208 *** .214 *** .213 *** 
           
TSPP ≤ TSPPexp ?̅?𝛽6 > 0 1.892 *** 1.601 *** 1.816 *** 1.783 *** 
TSPP > TSPPexp ?̅?𝛽7 ≠ 0 .031 *** .091 *** .039 *** .041 *** 
TIP ≤ TIPexp ?̅?𝛽8 < 0 -4.228 *** -4.256 *** -4.229 *** -4.195 *** 
TIP > TIPexp ?̅?𝛽9 ≠ 0 .042 *** .034 *** .018 * .011  
           ∆MarketShare 
?̅?𝛽10 







                Median Pseudo R²  .660 .627 .672 .668 
Median BIC  1.048 1.123 1.064 1.064 
Median Hit Rate  .925 .923 .936 .936 
Median Hit Rate Pulses (Ones) .837 .818 .840 .840 
      * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. Tests are one-sided if clear directional effects are expected (see Expected sign column), two-sided if 
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